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295 
A NEW REMEDY STRESSES THE NEED FOR 
INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION: THE IMPACT OF 
THE LAGRAND CASE ON A DOMESTIC COURT’S 
VIOLATION OF A FOREIGN NATIONAL’S 
CONSULAR RELATIONS RIGHTS UNDER THE 
VIENNA CONVENTION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Vienna Convention was established to preserve national 
sovereignty over social and political matters. Recently, the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) held that a violation of Article 36 of the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations1 (VCCR) has the potential of reversing 
a foreign national’s conviction and sentence.2 In the LaGrand3 case, the 
United States executed two German nationals in violation of both the 
Vienna Convention and provisional measures issued by Germany.4 The 
LaGrand case provides an overview of the problems with ICJ enforcement 
of the VCCR while shedding some light on the consequences that can 
arise when a nation does not comply with its treaty obligations.  
The tragic events of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent detention 
of numerous foreign nationals, present a need to examine the LaGrand 
case as it relates to enforcement of ICJ decisions and the application of 
international law.  
This Recent Development presents a first look at how the ICJ provides 
a remedy when a domestic court violates a foreign national’s consular 
relations rights under the Vienna Convention. Additionally, I discuss the 
impact of the LaGrand decision on future VCCR violations by stressing 
the importance for law enforcement agencies and the judicial system to 
understand these treaty obligations.5  
 
 
 1. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, infra note 24. 
 2. See Frederic L. Kirgis, World Court Rules Against the United States in LaGrand Case 
Arising from a Violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, ASIL INSIGHTS ¶ 11 (July 
2001), available at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh75.html. This American Society of International 
Law (ASIL) article discusses the factual background of the LaGrand case, the issues resolved by the 
Court, and the decision’s future application.  
 3. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. (June 27), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusjudgment/ijus_ijudgment_20010625.html. 
 4. Id. This final judgment from the ICJ discusses the facts of the LaGrand case, the 
admissibility of the German government’s four submissions, and the judgment that followed. Id. 
 5. Rebecca E. Woodman, International Miranda? Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations, 70 J. KAN. BAR ASSOC. 41, 42 (2001). A nation’s failure to comply with this 
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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
On February 17, 1984, an Arizona court convicted Walter LaGrand and 
his half-brother, Karl Hinze LaGrand, of murder and sentenced them to 
death.6 These convictions arose from the defendants’ failed attempt to rob 
the Valley National Bank in Marana, Arizona, on January 7, 1982.7  
The defendants presented several arguments to the Supreme Court of 
Arizona regarding the admission of Karl’s confessions into evidence and 
the imposition of the death penalty for Walter’s felony murder conviction.8 
The issue of suppressing Karl’s confession focused on the fact that he 
clearly invoked his Miranda rights to remain silent and speak to an 
attorney.9 Additionally, the court, while taking into account all appropriate 
mitigating factors, reviewed whether the aggravating circumstances were 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.10 The Supreme Court of Arizona 
affirmed the trial court’s judgment that Karl’s confession, which 
exculpated his brother, Walter, was properly excluded on the basis of 
 
 
treaty can threaten foreign relations, weaken its status and authority in the international community, 
and place its own citizens at serious risk. Id. See also Linda Jane Springrose, Strangers in a Strange 
Land: The Rights of Non-Citizens Under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 
14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 185, 191 (1999) (“Remember, always, that these are mutual obligations. In 
general, you should treat the foreign national as you would want an American citizen to be treated in a 
similar situation in a foreign country.” (quoting CONSULAR NOTIFICATION AND ACCESS, infra note 34, 
at 21)). 
 6. State v. LaGrand, 734 P.2d 563, 565 (Ariz. 1987). The defendants were convicted of first-
degree murder, attempted murder in the first degree, attempted armed robbery, and two counts of 
kidnapping. Id. Subsequently, the defendants appealed to the Supreme Court of Arizona. Id. 
 7. Id. at 565. After the attempted bank robbery, the bank manager, Ken Hartsock, was found 
stabbed to death and the LaGrand brothers were identified as the prime suspects. Id. at 566. 
 8. Id. at 567. 
 9. Id. Although Karl confessed to the crimes, the trial court ruled that the confessions were 
taken in violation of his Miranda rights and granted the motion to repress. Id. at 568. However, both 
parties reversed their positions and the defendants then tried to have the confessions ruled admissible 
in order to prove that Walter should be charged with a lesser crime. Id. at 568. The Supreme Court of 
Arizona examined whether these hearsay confessions should be admitted to exculpate a co-defendant 
by looking at Arizona Rules of Evidence, which provide in Rule 804(b)(3) that, “a statement which 
was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so 
far tended to subject him to civil or criminal liability . . . that a reasonable man in his position would 
not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true.” Id. at 569. A statement tending to expose 
the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless 
corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. Id.  
 10. Id. at 576-77. The trial court found the presence of three aggravating circumstances: the prior 
conviction of a violent felony, the expectation of receiving something of pecuniary value, and the 
“commission of the crime ‘in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner.’” Id. at 576. In 
addition, the court considered three mitigating factors: the defendants “prior home life,” their ages of 
eighteen and nineteen when the murder took place, and their remorse towards the death of the bank 
manager. Id. at 577. The trial court found that the three aggravating circumstances outweighed the 
mitigating factors and therefore imposed the death penalty. Id. at 576-77. 
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unreliability, and that the imposition of death penalty was proper.11 
At trial, the defendants’ counsel did not raise the issue of 
noncompliance with the Vienna Convention, however, during the habeas 
corpus proceeding counsel raised these claims, only to be subsequently 
rejected on the basis of the procedural default rule.12 The Ninth Circuit 
affirmed, holding that the LaGrands failed to show an objective external 
factor that prevented them from raising the issue of the VCCR violation at 
the state court level.13 After the Ninth Circuit ruling, Arizona executed 
Karl LaGrand on February 24, 1999.14 
III. RULING OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 
Although Walter and Karl LaGrand lived in the United States for most 
of their lives, they remained German nationals at all times and never 
acquired American citizenship.15 On March 2, 1999, the Federal Republic 
of Germany instituted an ICJ action against the United States for 
violations of the VCCR.16 The ICJ is the judicial branch of the United 
Nations and has the power to interpret treaties and resolve disputes.  
 
 
 11. Id. at 563. Chief Justice Gordon wrote the opinion with Justices Cameron and Holohan 
concurring and Justice Feldman filing an opinion concurring in part. Id. at 579-80. 
 12. See LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. ¶ 23 (June 27). According to American law, 
this rule:   
is a federal rule that, before a state criminal defendant can obtain relief in federal court, the claim 
must be presented to a state court. If a state defendant attempts to raise a new issue in a federal 
habeas corpus proceeding, the defendant can only do so by showing cause and prejudice. Cause is 
an external impediment that prevents a defendant from raising a claim, and prejudice must be 
obvious on its face. One important purpose of this rule is to ensure that the state courts have an 
opportunity to address issues going to the validity of state convictions before the federal courts 
intervene. 
Id. 
 13. LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 14. Roger Cohen, U.S. Execution of German Stirs Anger, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1999, at A14. 
 15. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 38 I.L.M. 308 (1999), Application Instituting Proceedings of 
Mar. 2, 1999, at http://www.icj-cij.org. The State of Arizona originally stated that they were unaware 
that Karl and Walter LaGrand were German nationals, but this proved to be false when the State 
Attorney, during the Arizona Mercy Committee proceedings on February 23, 1999, revealed that 
authorities had been aware of the LaGrands’ German nationality since 1982. LaGrand Case, 38 I.L.M. 
at 309.  
 16. LaGrand Case, 38 I.L.M. at 308. Germany bases its jurisdiction on Article I of the Optional 
Protocol which reads: 
Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the Convention shall lie within the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ and may accordingly by brought before the Court by an 
application made by any party to the dispute being a Party to the present Protocol. 
Id. at 311. The United States did not deny that this violation of Article 36 would confer jurisdiction on 
the ICJ, but argued that the individual rights of the LaGrand brothers did not impose jurisdiction 
because diplomatic protection is a concept of customary international law and does not concern the 
interpretation or application of the Vienna Convention. See LaGrand Case, 2001 I.C.J. ¶ 40 (June 27). 
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In addition to the request for judicial proceedings on the violations by 
the United States, Germany also requested the immediate issuance of 
provisional measures.17 The ICJ unanimously adopted this Order and 
requested that the United States government transmit these demands to the 
Governor of Arizona and stay the execution.18 Germany, in requesting 
provisional measures, intended to force the United States to refrain from 
any action that might interfere with the subject matter of the dispute while 
judicial proceedings remained pending in the ICJ.19 The ICJ found that the 
execution of Walter LaGrand would cause irreparable harm to the rights 
claimed by Germany and that these provisional measures were justified 
due to the urgency of the scheduled execution.20  
The German government and the ICJ were not alone in arguing for a 
stay of execution. When the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the case, 
Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion argued that Germany had valid reasons 
for the late filing of its action.21 Additionally, the Arizona Board of 
Executive Clemency voted to recommend a reprieve for LaGrand.22 
Nevertheless, Arizona executed Walter LaGrand on March 3, 1999.23  
After the executions, the German government continued its legal battle 
and its request for judicial proceedings was granted. During the ICJ 
hearings on November 13, 2000, Germany argued that in convicting and 
 
 
 17. LaGrand Case, 38 I.L.M. at 310. Karl LaGrand had already been executed and Walter 
LaGrand was scheduled for execution on March 3, 1999. Id. 
 18. Press Communiqué, ICJ, Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 
(Germany v. United States of America) 1999/99 (Mar. 3, 1999), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/ 
icjwww/ipresscom/ipress1999/ipresscom9909_igus_19990303.htm. The representative of the United 
States objected to the provisional measures because they had been made after much delay and were 
issued without hearing testimony from both parties. This was the first time that the Court issued 
provisional measures proprio motu (“without having first duly been heard”). Id. 
 19. LaGrand Case, 38 I.L.M. at 313. Due to the planned execution of Walter LaGrand, the ICJ 
issued provisional measures in accordance with Article 41 of the Vienna Convention stating that: 
(a) The United States of America should take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Walter 
LaGrand is not executed pending the final decision in these proceedings, and should inform the 
Court of all the measures which it has taken in implementation of this Order; (b) The Government 
of the United States of America should transmit this Order to the Governor of the State of 
Arizona.  
Id. at 313. 
 20. Id. at 310. Germany’s rights were conferred onto them by signing the Vienna Convention, 
which enumerates in Article 41 the preservation of the respective rights of the parties pending the 
Court’s decision. Id. 
 21. Fed. Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111, 114 (1999) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
 22. LaGrand Case, 38 I.L.M. at 311. See also Jerry Kammer & Mary Beth Warner, Germans 
Knock U.S. Justice: Media, Citizens Decry Death as Form of Punishment, Criticize Hull, ARIZ. 
REPUBLIC, Mar. 4, 1999. The Governor of Arizona rejected this recommendation. Id. 
 23. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. ¶ 34 (June 27). 
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executing the LaGrand brothers, the United States violated its international 
legal obligations to Germany as well as the diplomatic right of Germany to 
protect its nationals under Articles 5 and 36 of the Vienna Convention.24 
Secondly, Germany claimed that the United States, in barring the 
defendants from raising their VCCR claims in their habeas corpus petition, 
violated its international legal obligations to Germany under Article 36, 
paragraph 2.25 Last, Germany claimed that the United States violated its 
international legal obligation to comply with the Order on Provisional 
Measures issued by the ICJ when it failed to stop Walter LaGrand’s 
execution.26  
The ICJ held that the United States breached its obligations to both the 
LaGrand brothers and Germany.27 The ICJ ruled that the United States 
violated the LaGrand brothers’ rights when it failed to inform them, 
 
 
 24. Id. ¶ 10. Article 5 of the Vienna Convention defines consular functions. Vienna Convention 
on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes, December 24, 1969, 21 U.S.T. 77, 82 
[hereinafter Vienna Convention on Consular Relations]. Paragraph 1 of Article 36 of the Vienna 
Convention provides: 
(a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with nationals of the sending State and to have 
access to them. Nationals of the sending State shall have the same freedom with respect to 
communication with and access to consular officers of the sending State; 
(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay, inform 
the consular post of the sending State if, within its consular district, a national of that State is 
arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner. Any 
communication addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, in prison, custody or 
detention shall also be forwarded by the said authorities without delay. The said authorities shall 
inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under this subparagraph; 
(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the sending State who is in prison, 
custody, or detention, to converse and correspond with him and to arrange for his legal 
representation. They shall also have the right to visit any national of the sending State who is in 
prison, custody or detention in their district in pursuance of a judgment. Nevertheless, consular 
officers shall refrain from taking action on behalf of a national who is in prison, custody or 
detention if he expressly opposes such action. 
Id. at 10. 
 25. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. ¶ 11 (June 27). This provision reads: “The rights 
referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations 
of the receiving State, subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations must enable 
full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this Article are intended.” 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 24.  
 26. See LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. ¶ 11 (June 27). As a result of these alleged 
violations, Germany has requested remedies in that Germany and the LaGrand family receive 
reparations, that the criminal liability imposed on the LaGrand brothers be declared void, and that the 
United States provides an assurance that it will not repeat its unlawful acts and provides the ICJ with 
effective review and consideration of all convictions where a violation of the VCCR has occurred. Id. 
¶ 12. 
 27. See id. ¶ 128. The Court during the LaGrand ICJ proceedings was comprised as follows: 
President Guillaume; Vice-President Shi; Judges Oda, Bedjaoui, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, 
Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal; Registrar 
Couvreur. Id. 
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without delay, of their rights under Article 36, paragraph 1(b) of the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations following their arrest.28 The ICJ 
further held that the United States deprived Germany of its ability to 
render timely assistance to the individuals concerned, as provided by the 
Convention.29 Additionally, by failing to take all measures at its disposal 
to ensure that Arizona did not execute Walter LaGrand pending the final 
decision of the ICJ, the United States breached its obligation under the 
Order that issued provisional measures on March 3, 1999.30 Lastly, the ICJ 
ruled that, in the future, the United States must allow review and 
reconsideration of the conviction and sentence for future German nationals 
whose rights are protected under the Vienna Convention.31  
IV. ANALYSIS 
In analyzing whether a treaty violation has taken place, the ICJ must 
first examine whether the United States has frustrated the purpose and 
intent of the VCCR. The outcome of this decision will not only determine 
the extent and consequences of the U.S. violation in the LaGrand case, but 
also present a framework for applying the VCCR on future violators.32 
A. Interpretation and Application of the VCCR 
After World War II, the international community wanted to codify 
consular law.33 On April 24, 1963, more than ninety nations joined 
together to create a treaty called the Vienna Convention on Consular 
 
 
 28. Id.  
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Press Communiqué, ICJ, LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001/16 (June 24, 2001), available 
at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/ipress2001/ipresscom2001-16_20010627.htm. The Court 
reasoned that the U.S. procedural default rule violated Article 36, not on its face, but rather by not 
allowing a detained individual to challenge a conviction and sentence by invoking the failure of the 
U.S. authorities to comply with their obligations under Article 36. Id. The Court ruled that the legal 
effects of the provisional measures under Article 41 create a legal obligation upon the United States. 
Id. Lastly, the Court set forth new precedent with its remedial measures in having the United States 
agree to have future violations be reviewed and reconsidered by the ICJ. Id. 
 32. Kirgis, supra note 4, ¶ 11. 
 33. Kelly Trainer, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in the United States Courts, 13 
TRANSNAT’L LAW. 227, 231 (2000). The formation of this treaty was in response to an effort by the 
United Nations to move towards the codification of international law as enumerated in Article 13(1) of 
the United Nations charter, which reads: “The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make 
recommendations for the purpose of . . . encouraging the progressive development in international law 
and its codification.” See LUKE T. LEE, CONSULAR LAW AND PRACTICE 23 (2d ed. 1991) (quoting 
U.N. Charter art. 13, para. 1). 
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Relations.34 The purpose of this treaty was to provide a uniform body of 
laws that would govern consuls.35  
Under current international law, foreign nationals have the right to 
contact their consulate and communicate with consular officers of their 
own nationality.36 Consulates provide invaluable services, such as 
explaining legal systems and cultural differences, comforting families, 
assessing one’s rights, and obtaining proper legal defense.37 The VCCR 
states that agents must, without delay, notify nationals of their right to 
contact the consul.38  
Currently, the Vienna Convention is binding on 163 nations, including 
Germany and the United States.39 In order to establish uniformity and 
promote fairness, a treaty must be evenly applied to all members. 
Therefore, one nation’s continuous noncompliance without retribution can 
make a treaty obsolete. If the United States continues to violate the VCCR 
then international reciprocity will ensue, causing the treaty’s mandate to 
lose effect.40 
 
 
 34. Trainer, supra note 33, at 232. Presently, over 160 countries have ratified the VCCR, and 
there are also numerous bilateral agreements dealing with consular relations. Id. at 232-33. A State 
Department Handbook issued in January 1998 summarizes the requirements for consular notification 
and bases its legal authority on the Vienna Convention, bilateral agreements, and customary 
international law. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Pub. No. 10518, CONSULAR NOTIFICATION AND ACCESS: 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AND OTHER OFFICIALS 
REGARDING FOREIGN NATIONALS IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE RIGHT OF CONSULAR OFFICIALS 
TO ASSIST THEM 42(1998) [hereinafter CONSULAR NOTIFICATION AND ACCESS]. This handbook 
served as an attempt to inform local authorities of the importance of the VCCR. Trainer, supra note 
33, at 251. It set out the procedures for when a foreign national is detained and that the right to 
consular notification is mandatory. Id. 
 35. The laws set forth in the treaty deal with various aspects of consular duties, including: the 
general details of setting up a consul, the duties and privileges of the consul staff, and the rights of the 
foreign nationals, and the right to contact one’s consulate when arrested or detained by local 
authorities. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 24. See also Trainer, supra note 33, 
at 232. 
 36. E.g., Cara S. O’Driscoll, The Execution of Foreign Nationals in Arizona: Violations of the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 323, 326 (2000). See also Trainer, supra 
note 33, at 234 (discussing how a consuls’ duties involve assisting their citizens and can prove even 
more necessary when foreign nationals face the death penalty). 
 37. John Cary Sims & Linda E. Carter, Representing Foreign Nationals: Emerging Importance 
of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations as a Defense Tool, CHAMPION, Sept.-Oct. 1998 at 28. 
A foreign government’s communication with their detained citizen is “essential to guard against the 
possible mistreatment of prisoners, and to facilitate the presentation of an effective legal defense by 
those possibly facing serious charges in a language they do not understand under a legal system with 
which they are unfamiliar.” Id. See also Springrose, supra note 5, at 195.  
 38. United States v. Alvarado-Torres, 45 F. Supp. 2d 986 (S.D. Cal. 1999). The State Department 
has defined “without delay” as “notification that should occur as soon as reasonably possible under the 
circumstances.” Id. at 991 (quoting CONSULAR NOTIFICATION AND ACCESS, supra note 34, at 20). The 
standard for this requirement is any time before a foreign national is booked for detention. Id.  
 39. Trainer, supra note 33, at 232. 
 40. Id. at 234-35. This reciprocity “will lead to U.S. citizens finding themselves in a strange land 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p295 white rd book pages.doc  3/10/2003   6:17 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
302 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 2:295 
 
 
 
 
B. Issues in the ICJ Decision 
In its LaGrand decision, the ICJ examined three issues in determining 
whether the United States violated its treaty obligations under the Vienna 
Convention. First, the ICJ looked at a foreign national’s rights in alleging 
a VCCR violation. In so doing, the ICJ examined the language and intent 
of the treaty, along with how both domestic and international courts have 
viewed previous violations. Next, the ICJ determined the weight of 
international law on U.S. courts. This analysis specifically revolved 
around the U.S. use of its federal doctrines to preempt VCCR application. 
Lastly, the ICJ focused on whether the issuance of provisional measures in 
the LaGrand case was binding on the United States. The ICJ’s decision in 
the LaGrand case and its following analysis provide careful examinations 
on the effects of international law on domestic courts and the ICJ’s ability 
to enforce a nation’s treaty obligations. 
1. Foreign National’s Rights 
One of the arguments the United States presented in the LaGrand case 
was that the defendants did not have standing to allege a violation of the 
Vienna Convention.41 In determining the validity of this argument, the ICJ 
looked at the language and intent of the Vienna Convention along with 
legal precedent. 
The plain language of the Vienna Convention confirms the drafter’s 
intent, which confers a private right upon individuals. The language of 
Article 36, paragraph 1(b) of the Vienna Convention provides:  
[I]f he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State 
shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State 
. . . [that] a national of that State is arrested or committed to prison 
or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner.42 
 
 
being charged with a crime they do not understand without any access to their consulate.” Id. The 
result of the United States’ continual violation of the VCCR will be poor trade relations and less 
tourism, which will cause a decrease in economic growth for the entire international community. Id. 
 41. See LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. ¶ 89 (June 27). I will take a look at recent 
cases, which dealt with the issue of an individual’s private rights and whether they had standing when 
a violation of the Vienna Convention took place.  
 42. Trainer, supra note 33, at 257 (quoting from the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 
supra note 24, art. 36). There were many statements made regarding the debated issue of what 
language should be included that would implicate individual’s rights, and eventually the drafters 
decided upon the language adopted in paragraph 1(b): to “safeguard a foreign national’s right to be 
informed.” See Mark J. Kadish, Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A Search 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol2/iss1/13
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Additionally, both the ICJ and U.S. courts have supported the provision 
that foreign nationals have standing to assert their individual rights against 
a violation of the Vienna Convention. In one of these cases, the ICJ 
granted a Paraguayan national standing when the United States violated its 
international treaty obligations under the VCCR.43 In Breard, the 
Paraguayan government issued provisional measures in order to stay the 
execution as proceedings in the ICJ were pending, but the Governor of 
Virginia and the U.S. Supreme Court went forward with the execution.44 
Similarly, in State v. Reyes,45 a Guatemalan national made custodial 
statements to law enforcement officials without being informed of his 
rights under the VCCR.46 In Reyes, the Delaware Superior Court held that 
the foreign national had standing to bring a claim alleging a violation of 
the Vienna Convention which, in effect, required suppression of the 
defendant’s testimony.47 
On the other hand, some courts have departed from this plain language 
test and imposed a burden upon a foreign national, in order to obtain relief 
via the VCCR, must show that the lack of consular notification prejudiced 
their case.48 This burden of prejudice test was used in United States v. 
Rangel-Gonzalez,49 where the court held that there was prejudice because 
the submitted affidavits fulfilled the three evidentiary prongs in the 
 
 
for the Right to Consul, 18 MICH. J. INT’L L. 565, 599 (1997). 
 43. Breard Case (Paraguay v. U.S.), 37 I.L.M. 810 (International Court of Justice: Case 
Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of April 9, 1998). The defendant in this case 
was a Paraguayan national convicted of murder and sentenced to death. The Paraguay Government 
only had limited communication with the defendant when they learned of his detention three years 
after the conviction. The defendant’s habeas corpus petition brought forth these claims of violations 
under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention perpetrated by the United States, but were subsequently 
denied based on the procedural default rule. Id. 
 44. Id.  
 45. 740 A.2d 7 (Del. Super. Ct. 1999). 
 46. Id. The defendant was the prime suspect in a murder. After the police detained him, he 
admitted to the shooting but claimed self-defense. Id. at 7-8. Facing a charge of first-degree murder, 
defendant moved “to suppress the alleged statements on the grounds that he was denied his consular 
notification rights in violation of international law.” Id. at 8.  
 47. Id. at 14. The court stated that the defendant was not required to show that he would have 
contacted the Guatemalan consul if he was informed of his rights under the VCCR, or that the consul 
would have affected the defendant’s decision to make a confession to police. Id. at 13. 
 48. Springrose, supra note 5, at 191. The test to prove prejudice is whether the defendant can 
produce evidence that (1) he did not know of his right; (2) he would have availed himself of the right 
had he known of it; and (3) there was a likelihood that the contact [with the consul] would have 
resulted in assistance to him.” Id. This test to prove prejudice came from the court in United States v. 
Esparza-Ponce, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1096-97 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that the violation of the 
defendant’s consular relations rights did not suppress his statements because the defendant did not 
have standing to challenge a violation of the convention as he was unable to show prejudice). 
 49. No. 99-10513, 2001 WL 820910 (9th Cir. July 9, 2001). 
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Esparza-Ponce test.50 Conversely, the court in United States v. 
Rodrigues,51 held that the defendant did not show that he was prejudiced 
by the authorities’ failure to notify him of his consular relations rights.52 
In response to the U.S. argument that the LaGrands lacked standing, 
the German government claimed that not only did the U.S. violation of the 
VCCR infringe upon its rights as a member of the Treaty, but also the 
individual rights of the LaGrand brothers.53 In addition to the clear 
language of the VCCR, Germany introduced evidence that the “United 
Nations Declaration on the human rights of individuals who are not 
nationals of the country in which they live,” confirms this view that the 
right of access to the consulate constitutes a foreign national’s individual 
rights.54  
The United States argued that the recognition of rights under Article 36 
does not determine the nature of those rights or provide remedies for 
breaches of that article.55 In weighing these arguments, the ICJ looked 
specifically at the language of the provisions in Article 36 and concluded 
that both the national’s state of citizenship and the foreign national himself 
have standing to bring a violation of the VCCR.56 Therefore, the Court had 
jurisdiction to hear the case of whether the United States violated the 
LaGrand brothers’ individual rights under the VCCR.57  
 
 
 50. Id. The defendant brought forth three affidavits as evidence of prejudice: his own stated that 
he did not know that he could contact his consul and that if he had known he could, he would have 
contacted them; an affidavit from the consul explaining the steps they would have taken to assist the 
defendant throughout his case; and an affidavit from an experienced immigration attorney stating that 
the defendant would have obtained a better result in the case with consulate assistance. Id.  
 51. 68 F. Supp. 2d 170, 183 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 52. Id. This court reasoned that foreign nationals must demonstrate that the VCCR violation 
prejudiced their case because these rights are derived from a treaty that does not implicate fundamental 
rights. Id. at 183. Furthermore, a VCCR violation is to be treated as a non-constitutional right and does 
not rise to the level of a Miranda violation. Id. The only evidence of prejudice in this case was a letter 
stating that the defendant had made incriminating statements, which provided evidence against him at 
trial. Id. The court ruled that this evidence did not rise to the level of obtaining relief for a VCCR 
violation. Id. at 183. 
 53. See LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.) 2001 I.C.J. (June 27). Like the Paraguayan Government 
in Breard, Germany contends that Article 36, paragraph 1(b) discusses “rights” of “the person 
concerned,” thus conferring an individual right upon a detained foreign national. Id. ¶ 75. 
 54. Id. This resolution was adopted by the General Assembly as 40/144 on December 13, 1985, 
in order to characterize the human rights of aliens. Id.  
 55. Id. ¶ 76. The United States continually argues that, although the rights under the VCCR may 
benefit individuals, they constitute neither a fundamental nor a human right giving rise to diplomatic 
protection. Id. 
 56. Id. ¶ 77. The ICJ reasons that the language of the provisions, which discuss “his rights” and 
“if he expressly opposes such action,” clarifies the intent of the drafters to create individual rights 
through the enactment of Article 36, paragraph 1. Id. 
 57. Id. ¶ 78. 
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2. American Courts v. International Tribunals  
In understanding the ICJ’s determination of whether a VCCR violation 
occurred in LaGrand, it is important to realize that there is constant 
tension between international and domestic law.58 Therefore, a nation’s 
application of the Treaty is important because it determines whether its 
legal and political institutions will incorporate the Treaty’s norms into 
domestic law.59 In considering whether the U.S. application of the VCCR 
should preempt its procedural default rule, we must examine the validity 
of the treaty in relation to the national legal system.60 This can be done by 
determining whether the treaty conforms with American jurisprudence.61 If 
a treaty is found to be self-executing, then its norms are directly applied.62 
Most case law dictates that a directly applied treaty has the same status as 
federal law, with the most recent law prevailing.63 However, this statute-
like status can differ depending on the nation’s policy for favoring or 
opposing the direct application of treaties.64 The United States holds the 
view that international and domestic law are two separate entities, thus 
 
 
 58. I believe the tension arises from each separate nation allocating varying weight to the power 
of the provisions and rights granted within the treaty. These views may change depending on a 
nation’s reliance on the treaty’s protection, and therefore it is “hypocrisy” that continues to create this 
strain on treaty compliance. 
 59. John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 310, 315 (1992). This transformation is a government action that interprets the statutory 
language. Id. A statute can clarify the language by paraphrasing, and other legal instruments, including 
an administrative regulation or legal precedent, can serve as an act of transformation in incorporating 
the treaty into domestic law. Id. at 314-15.  
 60. Id. at 316. This article discusses the landscape of legal/constitutional issues regarding treaties 
in domestic law: (1) the power to negotiate; (2) the power to “sign”; (3) the power to accept the treaty 
as a binding international law obligation; (4) the validity of the treaty under national constitutional 
law; (5) the power to implement the treaty obligations; (6) direct applicability of the treaty in domestic 
law; (7) invocability in municipal law; (8) a hierarchy of norms in domestic law when treaty norms 
conflict with norms of that law; and (9) the power to administer the treaty. Id. 
 61. Id. at 317. Sometimes, legal institutions determine that only portions of a treaty are directly 
applicable while the rest of the treaty is not. Id. 
 62. Id. at 320. To determine self-execution, U.S. courts will look to the intent of the drafters. Id. 
When the treaty’s language is precise requiring no further government action, the treaty is self-
executing. Id. 
 63. Id. at 320. “Direct application of a treaty” means that courts will look to the treaty language 
as a source of law. Id. at 321. 
 64. Id. at 323. Individuals in favor of the direct application of treaties argue that international law 
forms a world legal system that has a higher status than domestic law. Id. In addition, it is argued that a 
policy of direct application assures treaty members that their international obligations will be carried 
out uniformly, and enhances the effectiveness of international norms and respect for international law, 
thus attributing to the benefit of world order. Id. at 322-23. Those who oppose this policy argue that 
international law is a separate legal system, and that an international norm should not be a part of a 
nation’s domestic legal system. Id. at 323. Similarly, direct application of a treaty would transform an 
international body’s interpretation of the law to be definitive in domestic law as well. Id. at 326-27. 
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only “requiring the implementation of international laws at the domestic 
level.”65  
In the LaGrand case, the United States continued its firm policy of 
allowing a later U.S. statute to prevail over the international agreement, 
which the ICJ interpreted as a violation of U.S. international obligations. 
The basis of Germany’s argument in LaGrand was that by applying rules 
of domestic law with the doctrine of procedural default, the United States 
did not give full effect to the rights conferred upon foreign nationals under 
Article 36 of the VCCR. 
Although the federal habeas corpus statute grants jurisdiction to a 
prisoner who alleges that a conviction in state court violated the 
“Constitution or law or treaties of the United States,” procedural hurdles 
remain.66 To overcome these hurdles, the petitioner must demonstrate a 
claim of “actual innocence” or that there was “cause and prejudice.”67 In 
recent years, death penalty cases where the defendants alleged violations 
under the VCCR have been dismissed under the procedural default rule.68 
The LaGrand case reinforces the U.S. policy of opposing the direct 
application of treaties as exemplified through the enforcement of domestic 
law when international law, or as in this case, the VCCR, conflicts with 
domestic procedural rules.69 Commentators believe that this conflict will 
not be eliminated and eventually international dispute resolution will cease 
 
 
 65. See O’Driscoll, supra note 36, at 325 (citing PETER MELANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN 
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 65 (1997)). This dualist approach proscribes that 
“international treaties are part of a separate legal system from that of the domestic law.” See Jackson, 
supra note 59, at 314.  
 66. Jehanne E. Henry, Overcoming Federalism in Internationalized Death Penalty Cases, 35 
TEX. INT’L L.J. 459, 472 (2000). The doctrine of procedural default states that if a defendant fails to 
raise a federal or constitutional claim in accordance with state rules, the claim is defaulted and a 
federal court cannot hear it. See LeGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. ¶ 23 (June 27). The 
LaGrand brothers’ claims were rejected in federal court under this premise. Id. 
 67. See Henry, supra note 66, at 473. To show cause, the petitioner “must make a novel claim or 
show that some objective factor impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rule.” 
Id. The Ninth Circuit held that a showing of ineffective assistance of counsel does not rise to the level 
of proving cause to overcome procedural default. LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.2d at 1262. Rather 
something external to the defense, which prevented the lawyer from raising the claim, must be proven. 
Id. To show prejudice, the petitioner must show that contact with the consul would have changed the 
plea or sentence. See Henry, supra note 66, at 474. 
 68. Id. at 466. These judicial barriers of applying treaty obligations have not been overcome in 
order to challenge the imposition of the death penalty. Id. 
 69. Molly Warner Lien, The Cooperative and Integrative Models of International Judicial 
Comity: Two Illustrations Using Transnational Discovery and Breard Scenarios, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 
591, 638-39 (2001). This conflict is created because the United States is a dualist system that considers 
international and domestic law separately. Id. The Supreme Court, in the 1889 Chinese Exclusion 
Case, held that the Constitution does not prohibit the enactment of laws inconsistent with an earlier 
treaty. Chae Chen Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
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to function unless American courts, when confronted with a decision by 
the ICJ, “accord a high degree of comity, deference, and respect for that 
court and . . . aid it in the . . . enforcement of its judgements unless to do 
so would violate a clear and express constitutional or statutory prohibition 
under U.S. law.”70 
If this conflict between international and domestic laws is to be viewed 
differently by the United States in the future, then the American legal 
system should also look at the burdens imposed on foreign nationals’ civil 
liberties. VCCR violations have become a due process catch-22 because 
foreign nationals are unable to seek relief when their claims are not 
brought forth during their habeas corpus proceedings, however, these 
claims are sometimes not presented because the violation deprived them of 
access to their consul who could then supply them with knowledge on how 
to bring a timely claim.71 
3. Request for Provisional Measures 
The purpose of issuing provisional measures is to preserve the rights 
that are the subject matter of the ICJ dispute. In addition, provisional 
measures provide an appropriate response to an urgent situation, which 
may be a threat to the international rights of states and to the proceedings 
before the ICJ while preventing irreparable damage.72 The issuance of 
provisional measures does not serve to undermine the findings by the 
domestic court, but rather to determine whether the treaty had been 
violated.73  
There are three main requirements for the issuance of provisional 
measures: (1) a prima facie demonstration of jurisdiction, (2) the risk of 
irreparable prejudice to the rights of either party, and (3) urgency.74 In 
 
 
 70. See generally Lien, supra note 69, at 639. This degree of deference is a vertical model of 
integrative comity, which would create a global reliance on an international tribunal’s decision. Id. 
However, U.S. attitude of domestic legal superiority, combined with the recent tragedy on September 
11, 2001, will deter this model from ever being followed. 
 71. See Springrose, supra note 5, at 195. 
 72. Sanja Djajic, The Effect of International Court of Justice Decisions on Municipal Courts in 
the United States: Breard v. Greene, 23 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 27, 35-36 (1999). As in 
LaGrand, a sentence of the death penalty would qualify for this request. The international community 
has favored the abolition of the death penalty by providing provisional measures as a safeguard to 
protect against its imposition. See Henry, supra note 66, at 466. 
 73. See Henry, supra note 66, at 475. 
 74. Alison Duxbury, Saving Lives in the International Court of Justice: The Use of Provisional 
Measures to Protect Human Rights, 31 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 141, 161 (2000). Humanitarian 
considerations like the preservation of life were the basis for the ICJ’s grant of provisional measures. 
Id. at 162. 
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VCCR cases, the ICJ bases its jurisdiction on the existence of a dispute 
between the parties as to whether the relief sought is available under the 
Vienna Convention.75 The question also arises as to whether pecuniary 
damages would be an appropriate and adequate remedy for a breach of 
rights in Article 36 or whether a stay of execution is necessary to prevent 
irreparable prejudice.76 The ICJ reasoned that the execution of Walter 
LaGrand would make it impossible to grant him relief.77 Germany’s 
request stemmed from the immediate threat of death to its national citizen, 
thus satisfying the third prong of the test relating to urgency.78  
One issue in LaGrand was whether the provisional measures were 
binding on the United States. An ICJ order is binding either as a matter of 
treaty law or from general international law.79 As discussed earlier, 
Germany could argue that because the United States consented to the 
treaty, it is bound by all the provisions inscribed therein.80 Germany could 
have also applied Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute, which provides that 
interim measures are “a general principle of law recognized by civilized 
nations.”81 In response, the United States argued that the use of precatory 
language supported their conclusion that the request was nonbinding and 
then put forth their position that federalism prevented an order to stay the 
execution.82  
 
 
 75. Id. at 164. Recent case law indicates that the ICJ must satisfy jurisdiction on the merits of the 
case rather than evidence of the continued loss of human life. Id. at 163. 
 76. Id. at 166. “Irreparable prejudice” is defined as damage which “could not be adequately 
compensated for in a final judgment on the merits.” Id. at 165. 
 77. Id. at 166-67. Although the execution would cause irreparable prejudice to the defendants’ 
human rights, there was no evidence that it would have this same effect on their rights under Article 
36. Id. at 167. Instead, the ICJ ignored the procedural rules of issuing provisional measures due to the 
presence of humanitarian concerns. Id. 
 78. With only a day before the scheduled execution, the ICJ examined the case and issued the 
order. LaGrand Case, 38 I.L.M. at 310. Although the ICJ has been criticized for permitting Germany 
to wait until the eve of execution, their ability to act quickly to protect human life demonstrates the 
world’s concern regarding violations of international law. Id. at 168-169. 
 79. See Djajic, supra note 72, at 37.  
 80. See id. This compliance comes under Article 94 of the U.N. Charter, which states that “[e]ach 
member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the ICJ in any case to which 
it is a party.” Id. at 38. These decisions include all those entered by the court and interlocutory 
decisions like an order on provisional measures. Id. 
 81. See id. at 40. Questions of enforcement, compliance, and relief do not affect the validity of an 
order for provisional measures. Id. 
 82. See Henry, supra note 66, at 475. In Breard and LaGrand, the U.S. government argued that 
following the provisional measures would disrupt the individual state’s criminal justice system by 
creating a “universal supreme court of criminal appeals.” Id. at 476. Black’s Law Dictionary defines 
federalism as “interrelationships among the states and between the states and the federal government.” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 612 (6th ed. 1990). 
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The major problem with the use of provisional measures is their lack of 
effectiveness.83 The LaGrand case reveals how the ICJ is unable to 
enforce both its provisional measures orders and final judgments.84 These 
results demonstrate that the ICJ is not the proper forum for dealing with 
nationals who face the immediate threat of death.85 Some commentators 
have suggested that human rights institutions should make the requests for 
provisional measures when the situation involves death row inmates.86 
However, in LaGrand these procedures were not used because the United 
States was not subject to these jurisdictions.87 Because many states are not 
subject to other procedures used in other international and human rights 
institutions, the trend of using the ICJ to request provisional measures will 
continue.88 The use of provisional measures in LaGrand and other VCCR 
cases demonstrates how the ICJ’s effective response to the imminent 
threat of execution is negated by the United States’ lack of adherence.89 
Therefore, any future changes in the use of provisional measures must take 
into account the United States’ refusal to implement ICJ’s orders and 
enforce international human rights law.90 
V. FUTURE IMPACT 
The United States’ continual violations of the VCCR have an impact 
on both the international and domestic level. First, there is the increase in 
litigation.91 There is also the threat of reciprocity.92 Lastly, these violations 
 
 
 83. See Duxbury, supra note 74, at 169. 
 84. Id. at 169. The enforcement of an ICJ judgment by the Security Council is an empty threat 
when the country being reprimanded, such as the United States in LaGrand, is a permanent member. 
Id. at 170. Any permanent member may veto a proposed action by the Security Council, therefore, this 
threat against the United States would prove ineffective. 
 85. See id. at 171. The ICJ is not a court of criminal appeal. Id. 
 86. Id. at 172-73. These fora differ from the ICJ in that they are designed to prevent irreparable 
damage to the rights of persons rather than the rights of states. Id. at 174. 
 87. Id.  
 88. Id. at 175. Article 41 will be exercised to protect one’s nationals from threat of irreparable 
harm. Id. 
 89. Id. In order for the ICJ to play a more credible role in enforcing its orders, it needs to clarify 
its purposes and requirements for granting a request for provisional measures in the context of threats 
to persons rather than states. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See O’Driscoll, supra note 36, at 339. Presently, there have been no successful challenges to 
a conviction for redress of a violation of VCCR. Id. 
 92. Id. at 340. Treaties themselves are reciprocal obligations between countries. Id. The continual 
failure of the United States to comply with the VCCR shows a disregard for the consequences of an 
ICJ decision. Id. If other nations follow suit in ignoring treaty obligations, the safety of all Americans 
abroad will be put in jeopardy. Id. 
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can weaken the United States’ international reputation.93  
While violations of Article 36 of the VCCR have continued, courts 
have failed to provide relief to those foreign nationals whose rights have 
been violated.94 One possible solution is to change the burden of proof. 
Currently, defendants bear the burden of proving prejudice.95 Shifting the 
burden to the government makes sense because they are responsible for 
these violations of international law.  
Numerous policy reasons favor shifting the burden of proof.96 As stated 
above, the United States’ continued denial of foreign nationals’ access to 
their consul will have a reciprocal effect.97 Therefore, it is important for 
law enforcement officials and the judicial system to become more 
educated on international law obligations and be diligent in informing 
foreign nationals of their consular relations rights.98 
Over the past couple of years, the U.S. State Department has 
implemented changes to provide greater enforcement of the Vienna 
Convention.99 One of these changes was to publish a handbook in January 
1998, which sets out procedures for detaining a foreign national.100 The 
federal government has provided international law resources and 
 
 
 93. Id. at 341. The denial of consular access to foreign nationals has resulted in significant 
disapproval by their governments. Id. The LaGrand case had the effect of causing Germany to submit 
an anti-death penalty resolution to the U.N. Human Rights Commission. Id. 
 94. See Springrose, supra note 5, at 193. 
 95. See generally id. By placing the burden on defendants, the courts find it easier to reject their 
theory. Id. Since the burden is on the government to make notification, they should also prove that the 
defendant was not prejudiced by the failure to notify. Id. at 194. 
 96. Id. Law enforcement officials continue to disregard a foreign national’s right to counsel. Id.  
 97. Id. at 196. Reciprocity could adversely affect U.S. citizens abroad. Id. Consular relations 
rights are mutual obligations, and the old adage “do unto your neighbor as you would want to be done 
unto you” is an important policy consideration in determining how to decrease these violations.  
 98. Id. at 198. This compliance with international obligations will also help prevent the recent 
increase in litigation that has put a further strain on government lawyers and judicial systems. Id.  
 99. See O’Driscoll, supra note 36, at 342. The State Department sends notices to governors, 
attorney generals, and mayors to remind them of their obligations under the Vienna Convention. Id. 
 100. See Trainer, supra note 33, at 251. The handbook provides instructions when detaining a 
foreign national as:  
(1) when foreign nationals are arrested or detained, they must be advised of the right to have their 
consular officials notified; (2) in some cases, the nearest consular officials must be notified of the 
arrest or detention of a foreign national, regardless of the national’s wishes; (3) consular officials 
are entitled to access to their nationals in detention, and are entitled to provide consular assistance; 
(4) when a government official becomes aware of the death of a foreign national, consular 
officials must be notified; (5) when a guardianship or trusteeship is being considered with respect 
to a foreign national who is a minor or incompetent, consular officials must be notified; (6) when a 
foreign ship or aircraft wrecks or crashes, consular officials must be notified. 
Id. Part One of this handbook provides a statement for officials to use when detaining foreign 
nationals; Part Two sets forth specific instructions in explaining the mandate of these rights; and Part 
Three explains the reasons for granting these rights of consular access. Id. at 252. 
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encouraged state and local governments to require training of consular 
relations rights in a similar fashion as they do with Miranda warnings.101 
Only with a clearer understanding at the domestic level of the possible 
consequences for failing to recognize a foreign national’s rights under the 
Vienna Convention will violations decrease and litigation subside.102 
United States compliance with the VCCR is essential to ensuring better 
foreign relations and to providing adequate representation to all people 
under the American justice system.103 
By fourteen votes to one, the ICJ held:  
[S]hould nationals of the Federal Republic of Germany nonetheless 
be sentenced to severe penalties, without their rights under Article 
36, paragraph 1(b), of the Convention having been respected, the 
United States of America, by means of its own choosing, shall allow 
the review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence by 
taking account of the violation of the rights set forth in that 
Convention.104  
The implication of this decision should be to establish precedent for the 
application of this remedy to all foreign nationals. The decision should 
also apply to sentences less severe than the death penalty.105 This new 
development is of even greater importance after the tragic events of 
September 11, 2001, which has shaped American attitudes toward foreign 
nationals detained for criminal behavior. Although the LaGrand decision 
signals a commitment by the United States to respect ICJ decisions 
regarding VCCR violations, it is highly unlikely that compliance or 
enforcement will result from its interpretation. 
However, with the recent increases in the number of detained foreign 
nationals, it is more important than ever for the United States to abide by 
the Vienna Convention. The new war on terrorism will require much 
 
 
 101. Id. at 252-53. 
 102. See O’Driscoll, supra note 36, at 341-42. These violations have had a detrimental impact on 
U.S. reputation abroad. Id. at 341. 
 103. Id. at 343. The international outcry over the recent executions of foreign nationals resulted in 
the United States, for the first time, being placed on Amnesty International’s list of human rights 
violators. 
 104. See LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. ¶ 128 (June 27). United States courts have 
consistently declined this remedy for a violation of Article 36 of the VCCR. 
 105. See Kirgis, supra note 2. It is highly unlikely that U.S. courts will order retrials or even 
rehearings on sentences imposed in these cases. However, some academics believe that this remedy 
will increase compliance as it provides an incentive for law enforcement officials who, oppose the 
release of convicted foreign nationals when the release stems from a violation of their rights. See 
Springrose, supra note 5, at 213. 
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financial and international support. Therefore, building foreign relations 
should be a top priority. If a VCCR violation by the United States cannot 
be properly enforced, however, the United States’ real concern is not that 
domestic convictions will be overturned by an ICJ decision, but rather the 
eventual backlash from the international community because of its 
continual noncompliance. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The United States has an international obligation to comply with 
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. When a foreign national is arrested 
or detained, he must be notified of his right to consular access under the 
Vienna Convention. As demonstrated in LaGrand, the United States has 
failed and continues to fail to notify detained foreign nationals of their 
rights. This attitude is also apparent in U.S. decisions to ignore previous 
orders by the ICJ to stay an execution.106 These violations of international 
law have led the ICJ to impose a new remedy of “review and 
consideration” upon a U.S. domestic court’s criminal decision. 
The tragic events of September 11, 2001 have caused our legal system 
to tighten due process rights and to place burdens on civil liberties. 
Therefore, it is important for law enforcement officials and the judicial 
system to be better educated about the rights of detainees under 
international law. There will be a time when the international community 
is not as sensitive to the United States’ non-performance of its 
international obligations. 
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